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Privacy Law That Does Not Protect Privacy,
Forgetting the Right to be Forgotten
MCKAY CUNNINGHAM†
INTRODUCTION: THE BIRTH OF A NEW RIGHT
Mario Costeja, a Spanish lawyer, could not pay his 
debts.1 His home was repossessed, and a local newspaper, La
Vanguardia, published a thirty-six word notice of the debt.2 
The short notice was published only once by the newspaper
in 1998, but it followed Costeja every year thereafter.3 Google 
searches under his name consistently retrieved the thirty-six
word notice of his old debt—even fifteen years after the 
original 1998 publication.4 Costeja sued, asking a Spanish
court to delete the record of the debt as to both La
Vanguardia’s publication and Google’s links to it.5 
Costeja claimed a right to be forgotten, that the old debt
was no longer relevant, and that both Google and La
Vanguardia must forever erase the thirty-six word notice 
and all reference to it.6 Because the case turned on law
† Associate Professor, Concordia University School of Law
1. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN [hereinafter Case C-131/12, Google Spain
SL]; EUROPEAN COMM’N, FACTSHEET ON THE “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN” RULING (C-
131/12) (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/
factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf; Daniel Lyons, Assessing the Right to Be 
Forgotten, 59 BOS. B.J. 26, 26 (2015).
2. EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 1; Lyons, supra note 1.
3. Lyons, supra note 1.
4. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL ¶¶ 18–20.
5. Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion.
6. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL; see also Dave Lee, What Is the “Right To
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496 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
promulgated by the European Commission, the Spanish
court referred the case to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), which exercises jurisdiction in
some instances over twenty-eight European Member States.
The CJEU directly addressed the certified question of 
“whether an individual has a right to request that his or her
personal data be removed from accessibility via a search
engine (the ‘right to be forgotten’).”7 The CJEU ruled that the 
debt notice could remain on La Vanguardia’s website but
that Google must delete any link connecting Costeja to it.8 
The high court ruling was instantly controversial.9 It set
a broad precedent, conferring a new legal right to force 
erasure of links to data on the Internet. The right requires
that Google and similar data “controllers” delete access to 
information deemed “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer
relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes” for which
they were processed and in light of the time that had
elapsed.10 The CJEU offered little guidance in determining
when personal information is subject to mandatory erasure 
due to irrelevance or inadequacy.11 
The CJEU did not identify or characterize how the new
right to delete information comports with countervailing
Be Forgotten”?, BBC (May 13, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
27394751.
7. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL ¶¶ 5–10; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
supra note 1.
8. EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 1.
9. See Meg Leta Ambrose, A Digital Dark Age and the Right to Be Forgotten, 
J. INTERNET L., Sept. 2013, at 1, 9–11; Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of
Privacy and Free Speech in the Age of Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1525, 1533–34 (2012); Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Delineating the Reach of
Internet Intermediaries’ Content Blocking—“ccTLD Blocking,” “Strict Geo-
location Blocking” or a “Country Lens Approach?”, 11 SCRIPTED 153, 155 (2014);
Peter Fleischer, Foggy Thinking About the Right to Oblivion, PETER FLEISCHER:
PRIVACY. . . ? (Mar. 9, 2011), http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2011/03/foggy-
thinking-about-right-to-oblivion.html.
10. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, ¶ 94; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra
note 1.
11. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, ¶ 94.
       
      
        
       
     
    
     
      
        
       
        
        
      
     
    
         
      
        
      
       
      
     
      
 
             
   
         
           
          
 
            
       
 
    
           
  
 
     
4972017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
rights related to free expression, media publications, and
political speech. What if a European politician demands that
Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft delete all links to past
indiscretions? Can those convicted of child molestation erase 
public notice of those convictions through the right to be 
forgotten? What about those who provide or publish
information? One reporter claimed he was “cast [ ] into 
oblivion” when his blog was delisted from Google searches.12 
Do bloggers, owners of websites, digital news outlets, and
others get an opportunity to object before their content is
blotted out by the right to be forgotten? Do they even get
notice? The CJEU ruling provided little insight to such
questions and allowed little time to consider them.13 
Indeed, Google promptly complied with the CJEU ruling 
by creating and publishing a deletion request form.14 On the 
first day of the form’s publication, Europeans submitted
12,000 requests to delete data.15 Within four days, it had
grown to 41,000 requests.16 As of March 2017, Europeans
had submitted over 715,000 requests to deactivate two
million URLs.17 Google has deleted over forty-three percent
of those, approximately 732,000 links.18 Early reports
suggested that a large percentage of deleted content involved
12. Robert Peston, Why Has Google Cast Me into Oblivion?, BBC NEWS (July
2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28130581.
13. See generally Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL.
14. Caitlin Dewey, Want to Remove Your Personal Search Results from 
Google? Here’s How the Request Form Works, WASH. POST (May 30, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/05/30/want-to-
remove-your-personal-search-results-from-google-heres-how-the-request-form-
works/.
15. Caroline Preece et al., Google “Right to be Forgotten”: Everything You
Need to Know, IT PRO (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.itpro.co.uk/security/ 
22378/google-right-to-be-forgotten-everything-you-need-to-know.
16. Id.
17. Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals,
GOOGLE (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/
europeprivacy/.
18. Id.
      
       
      
      
       
     
    
      
    
     
       
    
    
       
       
     
      
      
 
           
     
 
      
               
       
 
           
         
      
          
         
            
    
            
            
 
            
           
           
         
          
498 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
accusations of fraud, child pornography, and other serious
crimes.19 One reporter revealed deletion requests made by “a 
British politician who’s trying to make a comeback, someone 
convicted of possessing child abuse images and a doctor who 
doesn’t want negative reviews from patients to be 
searchable.”20 After Google inadvertently revealed
information about those requesting data deletion, it
appeared that ninety-five percent of the erasure requests
derive from “ordinary members of the public.”21 Regardless,
it remains difficult to know who is requesting content
deletion and why.22 
Commentators from diverse socio-political backgrounds,
but particularly from the United States, decry the right to be 
forgotten as antithetical to free expression and as distorting
the benefits attending unfiltered access to information.23 One 
law professor claims “[a]n overly expansive right to be 
forgotten will lead to censorship of the Internet because data
19. Leslie D’Monte, Right to Be Forgotten Poses a Legal Dilemma in India, 
LIVE MINT (June 6, 2014), http://www.livemint.com/Industry/5jmbcpuHqO7U 
wX3IBsiGCM/Right-to-be-forgotten-poses-a-legal-dilemma-in-India.html;
Preece et al., supra note 15.
20. David Mitchell, The Right To Be Forgotten Will Turn the Internet into a
Work of Fiction, GUARDIAN (July 5, 2014), http:// www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2014/jul/06/right-to-be-forgotten-internet-work-of-fiction-david-
mitchell-eu-google.
21. Sylvia Tippmann & Julia Powles, Google Accidentally Reveals Data on
‘Right to be Forgotten’ Requests, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/14/google-accidentally-
reveals-right-to-be-forgotten-requests (“Less than 5% of nearly 220,000
individual requests made to Google to selectively remove links to online
information concern criminals, politicians and high-profile public figures, the
Guardian has learned, with more than 95% of requests coming from everyday
members of the public.”).
22. See Ravi Antani, The Resistance of Memory: Could the European Union’s 
Right to be Forgotten Exist in the United States?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173,
1199–1204 (2015).
23. Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to Be 
Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 354 
(2015) (“In this part of the Article, we compare the EU and U.S. privacy regimes 
and explain how the EU’s right to be forgotten, as currently framed, is
antithetical to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”).
       
      
      
        
 
     
   
     
            
              
        
             
  
      
     
       
      
   
       
       
     
           
       
       
     
       
     
 
     
           
             
      
        
        
         
   
              
    
 
4992017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
subjects can force search engines or websites to erase 
personal data, which may rewrite history.”24 If content
becomes less searchable, others assert it will “derogate[ ] the 
role of counterspeech.”25 
Wikipedia’s founder portrayed the right to be forgotten
as “completely insane,” maintaining that 
[i]n the case of truthful, non-defamatory information obtained le-
gally, I think there is no possibility of any defensible ‘right’ to censor
what other people are saying. You do not have the right to use the
law to prevent Wikipedia editors from writing truthful information,
nor do you have a right to use the law to prevent Google from pub-
lishing truthful information.26 
Admittedly, the author of this Article agreed, writing that
“European filtering of Internet content worldwide through
the right to be forgotten . . . effectuates international
censorship in the guise of privacy. . . .”27 
This Article confronts these predictions. Are these 
censorship consequences manifesting? Will they? Start with
“patient zero,” the first person granted anonymity under the 
right to be forgotten. Mario Costeja sought to erase any
report of his 1998 debt, and yet in a single day in 2014 “840 
articles in the world’s largest media outlets were published
in reference to his case, including in countries where his
name would otherwise never have been heard, and where the 
[CJEU’s] ruling will never reach.”28 Today, a Google search
under Costeja’s name generates thousands of articles,
24. Id. at 372.
25. Robert G. Larson III, Forgetting the First Amendment: How Obscurity-
Based Privacy and a Right to Be Forgotten Are Incompatible with Free Speech, 18
COMM. L. & POL’Y 91, 114 (2013).
26. Preece, supra note 15 (internal quotations omitted).
27. McKay Cunningham, Free Expression, Privacy, and Diminishing
Sovereignty in the Information Age: The Internationalization of Censorship, 69
ARK. L. REV. 71, 114 (2016).
28. James Ball, Costeja González and a Memorable Fight for the ‘Right to Be 
Forgotten’, GUARDIAN (May 14, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/
2014/may/14/mario-costeja-gonzalez-fight-right-forgotten.
      
       
       
  
       
       
     
       
       
      
       
     
    
      
      
      
         
     
         
      
       
     
        
    
       
 
         
      
      
        
 
           
      
 
              
        
 
500 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
linking him to the right to be forgotten, and ultimately to his
1998 debt. Costeja’s attempt to suppress information only
amplified it.
But perhaps Costeja’s case is unique. As the first to 
exercise the right, his request was the most public and
controversial.29 Certainly others seeking data erasure 
succeeded in withdrawing their personal information from
the public eye? A close look, however, indicates that these 
less polemical erasure requests faced similar barriers,
revealing the difficulty inherent in erasing digital data.30 
An assortment of unaffiliated entities purposely
undermine efforts to delete links under the right to be 
forgotten.31 Soon after Google began delisting links, the 
website “Hidden from Google” began tracking the very
content targeted for deletion, memorializing the delisted
links on the website as well as the relevant search term and
the source that hosted the content.32 Links to information
involving a shoplifting incident, a financial scandal, and an
alleged sexual predator disappeared from Google search
results only to reappear on the “Hidden from Google”
webpage.33 News media increasingly do the same,
particularly for stories they publish and that Google delists.
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) re-publishes
the stories it generates and Google delists,34 and others like 
29. See Antani, supra note 22, at 1174–77.
30. See infra Part V.
31. See infra Section III.B.
32. HIDDEN FROM GOOGLE (Sept. 19, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20160919031318/http://hiddenfromgoogle.afaqtariq.com/?.
33. Jeff Roberts, “Hidden from Google” Shows Sites Censored Under EU’s 
Right-to-be-Forgotten Law, GIGAOM (July 16, 2014, 6:41 AM),
https://gigaom.com/2014/07/16/hidden-from-google-shows-sites-censored-under-
eus-right-to-be-forgotten-law/.
34. Neel McIntosh, List of BBC Web Pages Which have been Removed from
Google’s Search Results, BBC INTERNET BLOG (June 25, 2015, 2:40 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/1d765aa8-600b-4f32-b110-
d02fbf7fd379.
       
        
     
   
         
        
     
   
      
         
      
    
      
      
        
     
        
       
      
         
 
       
  
          
        
            
            
          
        
 
       
              
          
            
 
              
      
 
          
    
 
5012017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
Wikimedia and Reddit maintain logs that track the content
from each link that Google truncates.35 
These accumulated efforts undermine the right to be 
forgotten and presage its failure. As soon as European law
strips content from Google searches, that content is added
back into the cyber commons through alternative avenues.36 
The best-case scenario for proponents of the right to be 
forgotten, is that “deleted” content becomes more difficult to 
find.37 As long as the search engine industry is dominated by
one or two providers, this best-case scenario is not so bad.
Google currently monopolizes the search engine market
and has been likened to the card catalogue of the Internet
library.38 But if it continues to delete links in compliance 
with the right to be forgotten, that status may very well
falter. The more content Google scrubs, the less attractive its
service, opening a market for smaller, perhaps regional
search engines that do not have assets or market-share in
Europe and are not subject to the right to be forgotten.39 This
is already taking place; Google’s market share fell from 81.56
35. Notices Received from Search Engines, WIKIMEDIA FOUND., https:// 
wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Notices_received_from_search_engines (last
visited Mar. 31, 2017); Things That Were Not Meant to Be Forgotten, REDDIT, 
https://www.reddit.com/r/nevertoforget/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (The forum is
described as a “[f]orum to post articles that have been removed by Google from
search results as a consequence of the right to be forgotten” when searched on
Reddit.); see also Geoff Brigham & Michelle Paulson, Wikipedia Pages Censored
in European Search Results, WIKIMEDIA FOUND. (Aug. 6, 2014),
https://blog.wikimedia.org/2014/08/06/wikipedia-pages-censored-in-european-
search-results.
36. See sources cited supra note 35.
37. See Roberts, supra note 33 (“The issue is more complicated still because
the law applies only to national versions of Google—meaning that the
story . . . disappeared from sites like Google.co.uk but not Google.com or
Google.ca.”).
38. Jeff John Roberts, The Right to Be Forgotten From Google? Forget It, Says
U.S. Crowd, FORTUNE (Mar. 12, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/12/the-right-
to-be-forgotten-from-google-forget-it-says-u-s-crowd/.
39. See Laurie Sullivan, Search Engines Struggle to Keep Web Traffic, MEDIA 
POST (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/265120/
search-engines-struggle-to-keep-web-traffic.html.
      
      
        
  
       
     
       
   
      
     
    
      
     
      
     
     
      
      
  
 
      
      
           
    
  
            
 
              
     
            
            
   
         
          
 
502 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
percent in 2012 to 71.4 percent in 201640 with some 
prognosticating that Google’s market share “is now likely in
permanent decline.”41 
In the long term, the right to be forgotten will not realize 
the goal of ensuring privacy to Europeans who seek to 
remove their personal information from public access. It
may, however, dilute Google’s primacy as the search engine 
juggernaut—a perhaps unsurprising secondary effect, given
the European Commission’s ongoing efforts to diminish
Google’s dominance in Europe.42 The EU’s failure to 
effectuate privacy goals through the right to be forgotten is
emblematic of EU privacy regulation generally.43 The 
borderless flow of information over the Internet eludes
traditional territorial-based jurisdiction and enforcement.44 
Until the EU conforms its policymaking to the Internet’s 
architecture, ongoing regulatory efforts will promote, if 
anything, unintended anti-trust consequences rather than
privacy objectives.
40. Desktop Search Engine Market Share, NETMARKETSHARE, 
https://www.netmarketshare.com/search-engine-market-share.aspx?qprid=4& 
qpcustomd=0&qptimeframe=Y (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
41. Dan Frommer, The Product that Made Google Has Peaked for Good, 
QUARTZ (Dec. 15, 2015), http://qz.com/573361/the-product-that-made-google-has-
peaked-for-good/.
42. See Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1771, 1793–94 (2012).
43. See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF “INFORMATION ECONOMY” 341 (Jane K.
Winn ed., 2006); Tracie B. Loring, Comment, An Analysis of the Informational
Privacy Protection Afforded by the European Union and the United States, 37 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 421, 424–25 (2002).
44. See Miriam Wugmeister et al., Global Solution for Cross-Border Data
Transfers: Making the Case for Corporate Privacy Rules, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 449, 
449 (2007).
       
    
        
         
     
       
       
      
      
       
     
    
      
     
        
    
 
            
            
         
     
    
          
  
     
    
             
        
         
 
              
     
        
 
             
            
              
   
5032017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
I. REGULATING FOR PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 
A. Conventional Regulatory Scheme, Unconventional 
Internet 
Omnibus privacy laws have been ineffective because 
they ignore the manner in which digital data is generated,
transferred, and used in the Internet age.45 Not only does
information arrive on the monitor of a connected device 
through circuitous and often unpredictable routes, but its
derivation can be similarly elusive.46 Data origins evolve as
digital data packets are augmented, duplicated, or otherwise 
altered.47 When it is possible to pinpoint the origin of 
particular data, the servers and IP addresses from which the 
information originate are easily replaced or masked.48 
Despite the nuances of transnational information flow,
laws that seek to regulate such information derive from
exemplars that existed long before the Internet.49 The EU’s 
seminal privacy law, the Data Directive, was enacted twenty
years ago—well before Internet commercialization.50 Such 
45. See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of
EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25
YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 22–38 (2000) (“The market for data protection is characterized
by widely dispersed individuals, with low stakes, entering into ad hoc
transactions with large enterprises.”).
46. See Curt Franklin, How Internet Search Engines Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS
TECH, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/search-engine.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
47. See id.
48. Eric J. Feigin, Architecture of Consent: Internet Protocols and Their Legal
Implications, 56 STAN. L. REV. 901, 935–38 (2004); David Balaban, What Do You
Know About Proxy Servers?, INFO. SEC. BUZZ (Apr. 15, 2016),
http://www.informationsecuritybuzz.com/articles/know-proxy-servers/
(explaining that proxy servers allow internet users to take a “side door” into a
website to hide the user’s identity).
49. See LISA J. SOTTO, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW DESKBOOK § 1.04
(2011).
50. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31
[hereinafter Data Directive].
      
        
      
          
       
      
      
         
       
     
    
      
         
      
 
     
          
   
      
     
        
       
 
        
        
            
          
  
           
   
         
         
        
              
          
          
    
         
              
   
504 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
“[e]arly privacy law could not have imagined, much less
accounted for, the ubiquity and complexity of Internet
communication. . . .”51 And yet, modern privacy law continues
to advance by accretion, building on earlier iterations of laws
that did not contemplate today’s technological reality.
In Europe, Nazi exploitation of personal information
during World War II prompted robust privacy laws and the 
labeling of privacy as a fundamental right.52 Nazis
discovered and leveraged personal information—often
religious, racial, and cultural—to destabilize occupied
territory and identify those for deportation to concentration
camps.53 A series of treaties, charters, and accords stem from
this historic catalyst, ultimately leading to the right to be 
forgotten.54 
The United Nations adopted the Declaration of Human
Rights soon after World War II, a portion of which promised
that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.”55 The 
European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights more 
directly identified privacy rights in personal information by
conferring the right to consent, access, and rectify personal
51. McKay Cunningham, Free Expression, Privacy, and Diminishing
Sovereignty in the Information Age: The Internationalization of Censorship, 69
ARK. L. REV. 71, 72 (2016); see also Dennis D. Hirsch, In Search of the Holy Grail:
Achieving Global Privacy Rules Through Sector-Based Codes of Conduct, 74 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1029, 1033 (2013).
52. See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1125, 1143–44, 1170 (2000).
53. See Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A 
Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 
609–10 (2007); David H. Flaherty, Nineteen Eighty-Four and After, 1 GOV’T INFO.
Q. 431 (1984) (A report on a 1984 conference on data protection in which “[o]ne
of the prime motives for the creation of data protection laws in continental Europe 
is the prevention of the recurrence of experiences in the 1930s and 1940s with 
Nazi and fascist regimes.”).
54. See Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 23, at 356–60.
55. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12
(Dec. 10, 1948).
       
    
      
        
      
    
      
     
      
     
      
       
   
       
      
        
      
      
       
       
       
   
       
     
 
            
 
            
            
             
          
             
       
             
     
         
            
         
           
           
5052017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
information.56 The Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data also targeted how personal data is collected, stored,
transferred, and altered.57 The level of generality in Article 
16 of the Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union is noteworthy: “[e]veryone has the right to 
the protection of personal data concerning them.”58 
This framework remains at the heart of modern
regulatory efforts. Europe’s Data Directive (hereinafter
“Directive”), largely characterized as the most influential
and progressive data privacy law worldwide,59 is patterned
from these legislative progenitors. The EU Directive 
legislates based on consent, access, transfer, and use—just 
as in previous Charters and Conventions. The Directive 
requires that personal data must be (1) processed fairly and
lawfully; (2) collected for legitimate and specified reasons; (3) 
adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which it is collected; (4) accurate and, where 
necessary, kept up to date; and (5) retained as identifiable 
data for no longer than necessary to serve the purposes for
which the data were collected.60 
A new European privacy law will soon replace the 
Directive.61 The forthcoming General Data Protection
56. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C
364/01).
57. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data arts. 5–6, 8–9, Jan. 28, 1981, 1496 U.N.T.S. 65.
58. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 16, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 55.
59. See Christopher Kuner, The European Union and the Search for an
International Data Protection Framework, 2 GRONINGEN J. INT’L L. 55, 55 (2014)
(“focusing . . . on E.U. law as the most influential body of data protection law
worldwide”); Shaffer, supra note 45, at 55–88.
60. Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 6.
61. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data
Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25 2012) [hereinafter Data
      
     
      
         
    
     
      
        
     
    
 
       
         
        
       
        
       
       
       
      
      
      
      
      
 
 
              
    
      
         
        
      
        
           
           
        
    
     
506 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
Regulation (hereinafter “Regulation”) directly binds EU
member states, unlike the current Directive, which merely
requires that member states enact national laws similar in
spirit to the Directive.62 True to form, the new Regulation 
again legislates by accretion, mirroring the Directive’s 
structure and many of its provisions, while also adding new
privacy rights and steeper penalties for privacy violations.63 
The Regulation, effective in 2017, legislatively confirms the 
CJEU ruling by expressly codifying the right to be 
forgotten.64 
B. The Right to Be Forgotten 
With the Regulation, EU residents may “have their data
fully removed when it is no longer needed for the purposes
for which it was collected.”65 Removable data includes text,
video, photographs, and other forms of information published
in various contexts including links accessed by search
engines and websites themselves.66 While lauded by privacy
advocates, the new EU law sacrifices implementation for
aspiration. Without regard to how data is gathered,
duplicated, stored, transferred, and used, the right to be 
forgotten can be enforced erratically, if at all.67 The 
Regulation’s Article 17, entitled “Right to Erasure” provides:
“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the 
controller the erasure of personal data relating to them and
Regulation].
62. See Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) art. 288, Feb. 7, 1992,
1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.
63. See id.; Data Regulation, supra note 61. 
64. See Data Regulation, supra note 61; European Commission Press Release, 
MEMO/14/186, Progress on EU Data Protection Reform Now Irreversible
Following European Parliament Vote (Mar. 12, 2014).
65. See European Commission Press Release MEMO/10/542, Data Protection 
Reform—Frequently Asked Questions (Nov. 4, 2010) (“People who want to delete
profiles on social networking sites should be able to rely on the service provider
to remove personal data, such as photos, completely.”).
66. See id.
67. See infra, Section III.B.
       
       
       
     
      
         
        
       
     
      
       
          
         
    
         
        
     
    
     
    
     
     
         
     
      
        
         
 
            
     
    
    
          
  
        
5072017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
the abstention from further dissemination of such data.”
This provision bolsters the CJEU’s ruling in the Costeja
case by legislatively recognizing the right to be forgotten.
Like the court’s ruling, the Regulation confirms a sweeping
new right. The new right aligns with Europe’s policy goals
and tracks earlier laws that prescribe the collection, use, and
transfer of personal information. But it again leaves
questions of jurisdiction and enforceability to afterthought.
If EU policymakers flipped their legislative approach by
crafting privacy laws around jurisdiction and enforceability,
it would reveal the inanity inherent in data privacy laws that
fail to account for how data is generated, used, and
transferred in the Internet age.
C. Transnational Data Flow, Over-Inclusive Terms, and 
Extra-Jurisdictional Reach 
It is not easy complying with the right to be forgotten as
well as with the notice, consent, use, and transfer
requirements under the EU Directive and forthcoming
Regulation. Most multinational companies have 
restructured leadership positions, appointing Chief Privacy
Officers to oversee compliance with laws like the EU
Directive.68 Under the Directive, organizations and
individuals who process personal data must provide notice 
before collecting it69 and obtain consent that is a “freely
given, specific and informed indication of [the resident’s] 
wishes.”70 After providing notice and obtaining consent,
personal data may only be “collected for specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way
68. See Abraham Newman, European Data Privacy Regulation on a Global
Stage: Export or Experimentalism?, in EXTENDING EXPERIMENTALIST 
GOVERNANCE? THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION 236–39 
(Jonathan Zeitlin ed., 2015).
69. See Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 7; Data Regulation, supra note 61, 
art. 6.
70. Data Regulation, supra note 61, art. 2(h).
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incompatible with those purposes.”71 In many cases, an EU
resident maintains authority to access and correct the 
personal data processed by an organization or individual.72 
Most recently, EU residents have gained the power to have 
it deleted altogether through the right to be forgotten.73 
These provisions, along with the increasing fines levied by
European officials for non-compliance, create a substantial 
burden on individuals and entities that process personal
data.
European officials were aware of the hardships the law
created. Compliance would be expensive and uncertain. Non-
compliance created liability exposure both financially and
politically. Because digital information can be collected,
used, and transferred anywhere, the law unintentionally
incentivized companies to relocate out of jurisdictional
reach.74 To forestall an exodus of information-reliant
businesses, European policymakers engrafted extra-
jurisdictional provisions in both the Directive and the 
Regulation.75 The European Commission justified the long
reach of the law by noting that “[w]ithout such precautions,
the high standards of data protection established by the Data
Protection Directive would quickly be undermined, given the 
ease with which data can be moved around in international
networks.”76 
71. Id. art. 6(1)(b).
72. Id. art. 6. Those who control private data must also protect it. Id. art. 17.
Protecting personal data requires that process it to “implement appropriate
technical and organizational measures to protect personal data
against . . . destruction or . . . loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access,
in particular where the processing involves the transmission of data over a
network.” Id. art. 17.
73. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note
1.
74. See Transferring Your Personal Data Outside the EU, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (Dec. 3, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/data-
collection/data-transfer/index_en.htm.
75. Id; see Kuner, supra note 59, at 60–71.
76. Transferring Your Personal Data Outside the EU, supra note 74.
       
     
     
      
     
       
       
       
     
        
      
       
     
      
     
         
      
         
      
       
        
      
        
     
 
               
             
         
        
       
    
         
    	
 
       
             
             
              
      
              
    
5092017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
In other words, the Directive and forthcoming
Regulation apply broadly and include extra-jurisdictional
provisions. The laws apply by definition to “controllers”
and/or “processors” who “process” the “personal information”
of EU residents.77 The laws define these terms so broadly it
is difficult to know who does not have to comply.78 Personal
data is “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable 
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one 
or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental,
economic, cultural, or social identity.”79 
Identifying information that directly connects to a
person, like home address, national identification number,
and personal financial data clearly fall within this definition.
But the definition, and subsequent interpretation, subsumes
more than data directly identifying a person. It includes data
that could lead to identification.80 Information is “personal,”
according to European officials, even though “the person has
not been identified yet, it is possible to do it.”81 The European
Working Party, responsible in part for interpreting the 
Directive, announced that “information need not identify an
individual directly to constitute ‘personal data,’ but the mere 
77. See Data Directive, supra note 40, art. 2 (“[P]rocessing . . . shall mean any
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or
not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage,
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission,
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination,
blocking, erasure or destruction.”).
78. See Liat Clark, ICO Commissioner Slams EU Data Protection Directive, 
WIRED (Feb. 7, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20160507055713/http://
www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-02/07/ico-against-eu-data-protection.
79. Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 2(a).
80. See Art. 29 Working Party Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, 00737/EN/WP148, Apr. 4, 2008, at 3, 8; Paul M.
Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of
Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1819–20 (2011).
81. See Art. 29 Working Party Opinion 4/2007 on Concept of Personal Data,
01248/07/EN/WP136, June 20, 2007.
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fact that the information is related to an individual capable 
of being identified results in the data being ‘personal data’
under the Directive.”82 
The new Regulation builds on the capacious scope of 
“personal data” by defining it as “any information relating to 
a data subject.”83 The operative character of these critical
definitions is inclusion rather than delimitation. One 
professor quipped that “neighborhood children who record 
orders for Girl Scout cookies” are processors of personal
information.84 Professors Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove 
note that Europe’s data privacy law arguably applies to 
anyone engaging in any commerce within the EU or with
residents therefrom.85 
As noted above, these broad definitions are not
circumscribed to those within the territorial boundaries of 
the EU. The Directive and Regulation amplify broad
definitions with extra-territorial provisions. First, both laws
prohibit transfer of personal data outside the EU unless the 
law’s requirements are met.86 Only nations with “adequate”
data privacy laws may receive data transfers from within the 
EU.87 European officials, however, have identified only
eleven nations as adequate.88 To avoid truncating Europe’s 
82. McKay Cunningham, Privacy in the Age of the Hacker: Balancing Global
Privacy and Data Security Law, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 643, 657 (2012).
83. Data Regulation, supra note 61, art. 4.
84. Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European
Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 183 (1999).
85. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 80, at 1817, 1874–76.
86. Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 25; Data Regulation, supra note 61, 
art. 41 (“A transfer may take place where the Commission has decided that the
third country, or a territory or a processing sector within that third country, or 
the international organisation in question ensures an adequate level of
protection.”).
87. Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 25(1).
88. Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data
in Third Countries, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 14,
2017) (listing Andorra, Argentina, Canada, Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle
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international commerce by allowing data transfers to only
eleven nations,89 the Directive offers other avenues for
transfer to those countries that are inadequate.90 Strict 
contractual agreements and “Binding Corporate Rules,”
import the Directive’s strictures to individual
organizations.91 The Directive allows very little margin for
parties to alter or manipulate the model contracts or binding
corporate rules.92 
Another extra-territorial provision ties the Directive’s 
applicability to “equipment” within the EU. The provision
disregards where the data processing takes place or where 
the processor resides. It focuses instead on whether any
European equipment was involved in the data transfer.93 
Each Member State shall apply . . . this Directive to the processing
of personal data where: . . . (c) the controller is not established on
Community territory and, for purposes of processing personal data
makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on the
territory of the said Member State, unless such equipment is used 
only for purposes of transit through the territory of the Commu-
nity.94 
Any transaction involving an EU resident likely falls
within this provision if the transaction occurs online. It
of Man, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Uruguay as providing adequate
protection). While the United States appears among the nations with adequate
protections, it is included due to the EU-US Privacy Shield and not its adequate
protections. See id.
89. See Shaffer, supra note 45, at 39.
90. The principal avenues for U.S. companies seeking to comply with the EU
Directive and thereby receive personal information from the EU include
obtaining actual consent of the data subject, standard contractual clauses,
binding corporate rules, and until recently, participation in the Privacy Shield
program. See Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 26.
91. See Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 26(2); Art. 29 Working Party
Working Document on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying
Article 26(2) of the EU Data Protection Directive to Binding Corporate Rules for
International Data Transfers, 11639/02/EN/WP74, June 3, 2003, at 5, 6.
92. See Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 26.
93. Id. art. 4.
94. Id.
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captures all e-commerce with Europeans, presuming that
EU residents use a laptop, smart phone, or other such device 
to facilitate the interaction.95 
The new Regulation abandons the equipment nexus. The 
Regulation, however, does not abandon an extra-territorial
reach. Instead of an equipment nexus, the Regulation applies
to all non-EU entities that offer goods or services to persons
in the EU.96 Dan Jerker B. Svantesson characterizes this
provision as “bring[ing] all providers of Internet services
such as websites, social networking services and app
providers under the scope of the EU Regulation as soon as
they interact with data subjects residing in the European
Union.”97 
It appears that European policymakers sought to protect
the personal data of EU residents regardless of where it is
processed.98 “[B]ecause of the scope of the Data Protection
Directive, any business that has contact with EU residents
on anything other than an anonymous cash-only basis has
effectively collected some form of personal data and thus
would be subject to the Data Protection Directive.”99 
Accordingly, both the Directive and Regulation diverge from
normative jurisdictional law.100 
95. See John T. Soma et al., An Analysis of the Use of Bilateral Agreements 
Between Transnational Trading Groups: The U.S./E.U. E-Commerce Privacy
Safe Harbor, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 171, 205–06 (2004).
96. Data Regulation, supra note 61, art. 3.
97. DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN DATA PRIVACY LAW
107 (2013).
98. See Kuner, supra note 59, at 57.
99. Soma et al., supra note 95, at 205.
100. Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 4 (stating that if a data controller is
located outside the EU, but uses equipment within the EU for any purpose other
than transmission, the law of the Member State where the equipment is located 
will apply); See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 
433 F.3d 1199, 1205–11 (9th Cir. 2006); Shaffer, supra note 45, at 39 (“Were a
country that attracted little U.S. trade and investment to restrict data transfers
to the United States, a ban would pose little harm to overall U.S. commercial
interests because of the small size of the country’s market.”).
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In one sense, these extra-jurisdictional provisions are 
critical. They are vital to a privacy law modeled on pre-
Internet progenitors. Without a scope that applies to anyone 
who “processes” information that feasibly relates to a
European, the law is too easily circumvented by proxy
servers and off-shore enterprises. But the law’s over-broad
scope generates a raft of negative secondary effects.101 It 
restricts a host of innocent companies and individuals, whose 
information use does not harm Europeans’ privacy.102 It 
invites uneven enforcement by data privacy officials who can
indiscriminately select disfavored entities for prosecution.103 
Finally, it disregards the sovereignty of other nations by
imposing European privacy law extra-jurisdictionally.104 
II. EU PRIVACY LAW, NEGATIVE SECONDARY EFFECTS 
A. Innocent (Harmless) Processing 
The extra-territorial reach of European privacy law,
viewed as necessary to capture transnational information
flow,105 renders the law grossly over-inclusive. Countless
innocuous transactions fall within the law’s ambit, exposing
harmless individuals and organizations to liability under the 
extra-territorial provisions. A small business in rural Ohio 
violates European privacy law if it conducts any business of 
any kind with a European resident and fails to adhere to the 
Directive’s mandates. Indirect connections to European data
through social media, business contact lists, and websites
that require registration, for example, also prompt
compliance.106 The scope of innocents caught by the law
broadens when considering the law’s application to data that
101. See supra Part II.
102. See supra Section II.A.
103. See supra Section II.B.
104. See supra Section II.C.
105. See supra Section II.C.
106. See Cate, supra note 84, at 183.
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could feasibly enable the holder to connect it to a specific
person, even if the holder herself cannot make the 
connection.107 Through such a capacious scope, the law
captures an ocean of “innocent” activities—data processing
that threatens no privacy harm to European citizens.108 
Some institutions, seeking to avoid European privacy
restrictions, attempted to anonymize European personal
information and thus claim that they had not processed
“personal information” and need not comply with the law.
Re-identification software, however, forestalls such a
strategy, broadening the law’s reach over harmless
transactions even further. Professor Paul Ohm, among
others, confirms that even information that remotely or
tangentially relates to a person can be de-coded and matched
once again with the proper individual.109 “The emergence of 
powerful re-identification algorithms demonstrates . . . the 
fundamental inadequacy of the entire privacy protection
paradigm based on ‘de-identifying’ the data.”110 De-
anonymizing algorithms can leverage as few as three data
points to connect “anonymous” data to an individual.111 
Given the ubiquity of data points already available, “any
attribute can be identifying in combination with others.”112 
107. See id.
108. Applying this definition of “personal information” to the right to be
forgotten also broadens the scope of the right to be forgotten. It amplifies the
range of data that is subject to deletion since the right to be forgotten is tethered
to an EU resident’s “personal information.” As noted above, the definition and
subsequent interpretation of that term reaches far beyond its denotation. It 
reaches beyond a request to delete photographs or links to Facebook profiles. It 
includes IP addresses, search histories, anonymized locational data, meta-data,
and a host of other data because that data could enable the holder to eventually
link it to the data subject. See generally Schwartz & Solove, supra note 80.
109. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1706–18 (2010).
110. Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Privacy and Security: Myths and
Fallacies of “Personally Identifiable Information,” COMM. ACM, June 2010, at 24, 
24–26 (2010).
111. See id. at 26.
112. Id. at 26 (emphasis omitted).
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In fact, “the more data [available], the less any of it can be 
said to be private. . . .”113 Through broad definitions of 
“personal data” and “processing” and through extra-
territorial provisions that expand its applicability, European
privacy law captures a sea of innocuous transactions,
revealing the wide gap between the privacy law and the 
harms it purports to redress.
B. Discretionary Enforcement 
Europe’s privacy law has been criticized due to inherent
unfairness that attends enforcement of an over-broad law.114 
Applied literally, officials could seize almost any laptop or
smartphone at the European border in light of the Directive’s 
near-universal application.115 Enforcement of laws that
incriminate a disproportionately large ratio of those 
governed by it, or that are so broad as to capture the entire 
body politic, have historically been declared invalid in the 
United States.116 They give enforcement officers carte 
blanche authority to prosecute disfavored citizens,
prompting corruption over compliance.117 
113. Patrick Tucker, Has Big Data Made Anonymity Impossible?, MIT TECH.
REV. (May 7, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/514351/has-big-data-
made-anonymity-impossible/.
114. See generally Cate, supra note 84.
115. See generally id.
116. See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 50–52 (1999) (holding a law
cannot be so vague that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot figure out what 
is innocent activity and what is illegal); People v. Golb, 15 N.E.3d 805 (N.Y. 2014) 
(striking down harassment statute where language was overbroad); People v.
Dietze, 549 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1989) (striking down a similar harassment statute,
former Penal Law, Section 240.25, which prohibited the use of abusive or obscene
language with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person); John Leland,
Top Court Champions Freedom to Annoy, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2014),
nytimes.com/2014/05/14/nyregion/top-court-champions-freedom-to-
annoy.html?_r=0 (discussing People v. Golb).
117. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 50–52. But see John C. O’Quinn, None of Your
Business: World Data Flows, Electronic Commerce, and the European Privacy
Directive, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 683, 691 (2000) (book review) (“the more
cooperative approach to enforcement generally taken toward regulatory regimes
in Europe, . . . and . . . the role of discretionary approach to enforcement that is 
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By reaching anyone who processes EU personal data or
data that could eventually lead to personal data, the law
creates a conundrum; “Europe cannot strictly enforce the 
letter of the Directive and at the same time announce that
organizations can routinely ignore it.”118 As a result, some 
commentators questioned whether the Directive was itself a
bluff.119 “Because the data-flow restrictions are potentially so 
harmful not only to third-party nation economies, but also to 
Europe’s economy itself, one has to wonder whether the risk
of noncompliance is really significant.”120 Literal
enforcement would effectively truncate the European market
from the international economy.121 
And yet, European officials have prosecuted multiple 
companies and imposed millions of dollars in fines. In 
December 2014, a German data protection commissioner
levied a €1,300,000 fine on the insurance group Debeka for
failing to administer internal controls over personal
information.122 In France, data protection officials fined
Google €150,000 because Google had not adequately
informed users how it processes personal information,
including violations relating to consent for cookie usage,
unclear data retention terms, and personal data collected
without adequate legal basis.123 There is an abundance of 
other enforcement actions under the Data Directive, mostly
taken . . . in Europe”).
118. PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA 
FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 155 
(1998).
119. See id.
120. Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Borderless High-Technology Economies:
Managing Spillover Effects, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 137, 141 (2002).
121. Id.
122. Johanna Laas, Germany: DPA Imposes Fine on Insurance Company, 
PRIVACY EUROPE (Jan. 7, 2015, 12:05 PM), https://www.privacy-europe.com/
blog/germany-dpa-imposes-fine-insurance-company/.
123. Geert De Clercq, France Fines Google Over Data Privacy, REUTERS (Jan.
8, 2014, 3:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-google-fine-
idUSBREA0719U20140108.
       
    
     
        
      
         
      
       
      
     
      
     
        
      
       
      
     
    
      
     
 
      
    
      
 
         
  
    
            
 
        
           
        
             
         
     
          
5172017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
prosecuting a selection of large businesses.124 These 
prosecutions suggest uneven application of the law because 
they target specific entities among a ubiquity of violations.125 
Notably, the Directive does not directly bind Member
States. Instead, it requires that each Member State enact its
own privacy law consonant with the Directive’s spirit.126 As 
a result, each Member State drafted discrete privacy laws
and each Member State retains discretion regarding
implementation and enforcement.127 This fragmented
approach compounds inconsistent enforcement. It will
change, however, with the enactment of the forthcoming
Regulation, which directly binds Member States and which
carries a heightened price for non-compliance: the greater of 
€10,000,000 or 2 percent of annual worldwide turnover or the 
greater of €20,000,000 or 4 percent of annual worldwide 
turnover depending on the violation.128 Although the 
Regulation harmonizes previously disparate laws of the 
twenty-eight Member States, discretionary enforcement will
continue under the Regulation due to its nebulously broad
scope.
C. Spurned Sovereignty 
As noted above, both the Directive and Regulation
include extra-jurisdictional provisions. Those provisions, in
part, seek to prevent the exodus of data-reliant businesses.129 
124. See SOTTO, supra note 49, at § 18.02(A)(4)(b)(9) (listing notable 
enforcement examples).
125. See id.
126. See Treaty on European Union, supra note 62; Data Directive, supra note
50, art. 28.
127. Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 28.
128. Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) art. 83, 2016 
O.J. (L 119) 1.
129. Data Transfers Outside the EU, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Nov. 24, 2016),
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They also purport to capture transnational data flow by
restricting entities that have no physical presence in
Europe.130 If a European citizen contacts an Idaho company,
which then sells its product through an Internet exchange,
the Directive applies to the Idaho company, which otherwise 
had no contact with Europe.131 By using “equipment” located
in Europe (the buyer’s laptop or smart phone) to consummate 
the Internet sale, Article 4 of the Directive purports to 
capture the Idaho company.132 
The right to be forgotten, in like manner, will soon
stretch beyond Europe’s borders. Google resists universal
application of the right to be forgotten, arguing that it only
applies to European domain names—searches that are 
directed toward users in Europe.133 A request for data
erasure from a Frenchman, for example, would only affect
google.fr rather than searches under all Google domain
names.134 Google has a strong argument, given the fact that
ninety-five percent of European users search Google under
their respective country’s domain name.135 
Limiting the scope of the right to be forgotten through
domain names is not the only alternative. Geographic
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/data-collection/data-transfer/
index_en.htm (“Without such precautions, the high standards of data protection
established by the Data Protection Directive would quickly be undermined, given
the ease with which data can be moved around in international networks.”).
130. Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 4; Data Regulation, supra note 61, art.
3; Soma et al., supra note 95, at 205–06.
131. See Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 4
132. See id.; Soma et al., supra note 95, at 205–06.
133. See Sam Schechner & Frances Robinson, EU Says Google Should Extend
‘Right to Be Forgotten’ to ‘.com’ Websites, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2014, 10:59 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-says-google-should-extend-right-to-be-forgotten-
to-com-websites-1417006254.
134. See Antani, supra note 22, at 1178.
135. See Brendan Van Alsenoy & Marieke Koekkoek, The Extra-Territorial
Reach of the EU’s “Right to be Forgotten” 16 (Ctr. for IT & IP Law, Working Paper
No. 20/2015); Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin (July 31,
2014), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/google.pdf.
       
      
     
       
      
        
      
      
       
          
         
        
     
       
      
       
      
        
     
        
    
    
     
 
           
      
        
        
       
        
       
 
        
    
        
   
        
   
    
5192017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
filtering, for which software already exists, more closely
approximates territorial jurisdictional limitations by
deleting data under the right to be forgotten only for those 
searches conducted in relevant European countries.136 All 
searches conducted in Germany, for example, would conceal
personal information that Germans and/or Europeans
successfully erased under the right to be forgotten. Identical
searches conducted in the United States would not.
The CJEU’s ruling was unclear on this point.137 It did not
specify that Google must de-list all links across all domain
extensions and/or all geographic boundaries.138 As a result,
Google currently limits data deletions to European
domains.139 A search for Mario Costeja on “google.fr” will 
reveal his old debt; the same search under Google’s Spanish 
domain will not.140 Google searches under European domains
prompt the following alert: “[s]ome results may have been
removed under data protection law in Europe.”141 This
present-day disclaimer reveals that Jennifer Granick’s 
prediction was not too far afield when she posited that the 
right to be forgotten “marks the beginning of the end of the 
global Internet, where everyone has access to the same 
information, and the beginning of an Internet where there 
136. See generally Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce,
and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation 
Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 61, 66–68, 91–92 (2011) (discussing how
geotechnologies provide an automated means of identifying a user’s location); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional
Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 80–85 
(2006) (discussing the legal framework for determining personal jurisdiction in
cyberspace).
137. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL.
138. See id.
139. Antani, supra note 22, at 1177–79.
140. Id. at 1178.
141. Charles Arthur, What Is Google Deleting Under the ‘Right to Be 
Forgotten’—and Why?, GUARDIAN (June 4, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2014/jul/04/what-is-google-deleting-under-the-right-to-be-forgotten-
and-why (internal quotations omitted).
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are national networks.”142 The Internet of Spain is not the 
Internet of France or the Internet of the United States.143 
But national differences in information access may not
last long. European officials recently signaled disapproval of 
the approach, characterizing it as unsatisfactory and easily
circumvented. The Article 29 Working Party, tasked with
implementation of European data privacy law, unequivocally
rejected application of the right to be forgotten through
domain extensions:
[D]e-listing decisions must be implemented in a way that guaran-
tees the effective and complete protection of these rights and that 
EU law cannot be easily circumvented. In that sense, limiting de-
listing to EU domains on the grounds that users tend to access
search engines via their national domains cannot be considered a
sufficient means to satisfactorily guarantee the rights of data sub-
jects according to the judgment. In practice, this means that in any
case de-listing should also be effective on all relevant domains, in-
cluding .com.144 
A French data protection authority recently confirmed
this admonition when it ordered Google to remove links from
its database entirely, across all domains.145 Harvard
Professor, Jonathan L. Zittrain, noted that “France is asking
Google to do something here in the U.S. that if the U.S.
government asked for, it would be against the First
Amendment.”146 Google has thus far refused to comply, but
the French pronouncement reflects the Working Party’s 
statement as well as the forthcoming Regulation.147 The 
142. Toobin, supra note 5 (internal quotations omitted).
143. See Antani, supra note 22, at 1178.
144. Art. 29 Working Party Guidelines on The implementation of the Court of
the Justice of the European Union judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia
Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gonzales” C-131/12,
14/EN/WP225, Nov. 26, 2014, at ¶ 20.
145. Farhad Manjoo, ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Online Could Spread, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/technology/
personaltech/right-to-be-forgotten-online-is-poised-to-spread.html?_r=0.
146. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
147. See Julia Fioretti & Mathieu Rosemain, Google Appeals French Order for
       
      
    
       
        
     
      
     
       
        
        
      
        
       
       
      
       
      
     
     
     
      
     
       
       
      
      
 
        
 
     
        
    
          
           
       
     
          
  
5212017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
Regulation not only legislatively memorializes the right to be 
forgotten, but according to the European Commission 
website, it also “leaves no legal doubt that no matter where 
the physical server of a company processing data is located,
non-European companies, when offering services to 
European consumers, must apply European rules.”148 
Upon the Regulation’s enactment, one person on the 
other side of the globe will determine what the rest of us see.
A German citizen’s request to erase Internet content will blot
that information not only from searches conducted on
google.de but also on google.com.149 It will delete links not 
only in Munich, but also in Philadelphia, New Delhi,
Auckland, and all points in between.150 The 732,550 links 
that have already been de-listed in Europe under the right to 
be forgotten would disappear from Google searches entirely,
or as the Working Party terms it, “effective[ly] and 
complete[ly].”151 Under this approach, European law
unilaterally determines global information access.
Extra-territorial laws, like Europe’s privacy Regulation,
undermine national sovereignty and democratic principles.
“France has no territorial jurisdiction over the U.S., but it’s 
purporting to tell Google to delete content from the U.S.
market, the Canadian and Mexican markets, and others.”152 
Citizens of non-European countries did not vote and had no 
representation in determining the right to be forgotten, but
the law purports to directly impact non-European citizens.
Global ‘Right to be Forgotten,’ REUTERS (May 19, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-google-france-privacy-idUSKCN0YA1D8.
148. EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 1.
149. See Data Regulation, supra note 61.
150. See id.
151. Art. 29 Working Party Guidelines, supra note 144.
152. Terry Carter, Erasing the News: Should Some Stories Be Forgotten?
A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2017, 12:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/right_to_be_forgotten_US_law (quoting Jonathan Peters, Chair of the
First Amendment subcommittee of the ABA Section of Litigation) (internal
quotations omitted).
      
     
 
            
           
           
       
         
       
    
    
    
       
       
      
      
     
        
    
       
       
        
     
     
 
        
           
         
             
        
        
      
             
         
       
 
         
    
   
522 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
One European commentator blithely acknowledged the lack
of comity:
[W]e may be tempted to say that when our courts conclude that cer-
tain content is to be blocked or removed, we want that blocking or 
removal to be global. However, [many people] . . . may not neces-
sarily wish for Internet intermediaries to engage in global block-
ing/removal based on court orders from all other countries in the 
world—particularly where such court orders stem from restrictive,
undemocratic laws with an extraterritorial effect.153 
Unilateral and extra-jurisdictional laws derogate 
normative international comity.154 They ignore democratic
values,155 and in many cases, they upend alternative privacy
protection regimes that tailor legal restrictions to the harms
that result from privacy breaches.156 Extra-territorial
privacy laws promote one culture’s devotion to privacy over
another culture’s preference for free expression.157 Finally,
they lay out an unfortunate blueprint for other nations to do 
likewise.158 The EU Directive and Regulation are one-way
ratchets. Other nations, in the name of privacy, can restrict
more information than the EU, but they cannot go the other
way by providing more access to information.159 It is entirely
possible that “there will be a race to the bottom towards
adopting the norms of the most restrictive legal system.”160 
153. Svantesson, supra note 9, at 155.
154. See Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 23, at 409 (asking what country’s law
applies among the hundreds of countries regulating the Internet) (“An Islamic
fundamentalist female might be held in contempt for appearing on a website that
shows her unveiled face” in some countries but not others.).
155. Svantesson, supra note 9, at 155.
156. See infra Part V.
157. See Robert Kirk Walker, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257,
274–76 (2012); Robert Krulwich, Is the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ the ‘Biggest Threat
to Free Speech on the Internet’?, NPR (Feb. 24, 2012, 9:06 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/krulwich/2012/02/23/147289169/is-the-right-to-be-
forgotten-the-biggest-threat-to-free-speech-on-the-internet.
158. Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 23, at 409.
159. See id.
160. Id.
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III. EU PRIVACY LAW, IMPOTENT PRIMARY EFFECT 
The Directive and Regulation attempt to capture 
borderless digital information through provisions that have 
near-universal application. The breadth of the law carries
secondary negative effects, including discretionary
enforcement and a disregard for international sovereignty.161 
But perhaps these negative secondary effects are necessary
to achieve the law’s primary goal—European data privacy.
The central tenant of this Article suggests that even broadly
applicable laws flounder when purporting to regulate 
personal information because they do not account for the 
Internet’s resilience and the digital architecture of 
information flow.
A. Search Engines 
The right to be forgotten applies to search engines, not
individual web pages.162 In Google Spain, the CJEU required
only that Google de-link Costeja’s name from the newspaper
article that originally published Costeja’s debt.163 The Court
did not require the newspaper to take down the offending
information from its website.164 In thousands of deletion
requests that followed, implementation was similarly limited
to de-listing links rather than requiring data erasure from
websites.165 
The BBC, Wikipedia, and others continue to publish
articles on their respective websites even though Google de-
listed links to those websites in compliance with the right to 
161. See supra Part III.
162. Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 23, at 374 (“After Google approves a 
takedown request, the requestor’s name and other personal information would
still exist on other web pages, which would not lead to the actual ‘forgetting’ of
any such information.”).
163. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL.
164. See id.
165. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 1.
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be forgotten.166 In other words, the websites that contain
illicit EU personal information still exist; the most
frequently used path to that information does not. The 
European Commission tacitly confirmed this approach,
positing a hypothetical in which a deletion request results in
Google de-listing links rather than requiring that each
website scrub the offending personal information.167 The 
personal information remains; it is just more difficult to 
access using a Google search.
Implementing the right to be forgotten in this way
presupposes only one or two search engines, a logical
supposition in 2011 when Google dominated the market with
over 83 percent market share.168 By 2015, however, Google’s 
market share had slipped to 66.41 percent,169 and “is now
likely in permanent decline.”170 The search engine 
DuckDuckGo, by contrast, grew over seventy percent in 
2015, receiving 3.25 billion search queries.171 It attracted
three million new searchers in October 2015 alone,
“represent[ing] more than 100 percent year-over-year
growth . . . .”172 
Google, Bing, Yahoo!, AOL, and Ask formerly comprised
166. See McIntosh, supra note 34; supra note 35 and accompanying text.
167. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 1.
168. Desktop Search Engine Market Share, NETMARKETSHARE (Dec. 1, 2011), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20111201121858/http://www.netmarketshare.com/s
earch-engine-market-share.aspx?qprid=4&qpcustomd=0&qptimeframe=Y. In
the United States, one 2015 study showed Google’s share at 63.8 percent. 
comScore Releases August 2015 U.S. Desktop Search Engine Rankings, 
COMSCORE (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Rankings/
comScore-Releases-August-2015-U.S.-Desktop-Search-Engine-Rankings.
169. Desktop Search Engine Market Share, supra note 40.
170. Frommer, supra note 41.
171. Dan Frommer, DuckDuckGo, the Search Engine that Doesn’t Track its
Users, Grew More than 70% this Year, QUARTZ (Dec. 16, 2015),
http://qz.com/574853/duckduckgo-the-search-engine-that-doesnt-track-its-users-
grew-more-than-70-this-year/.
172. Id.
       
       
       
     
       
        
        
      
    
      
       
     
       
        
      
     
     
       
       
      
 
            
        
 
 
           
    
            
         
        
  
      
               
     
       
       
             
        
     
 
5252017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
the world’s most popular search engines,173 but scores of 
others exist, and several are regionally dominant.174 Yandex
has a sixty-two percent market share in Russia, while Baidu
is China’s most popular search engine.175 Naver accounts for
over seventy percent of South Korea’s searches, and Yahoo!
Japan services most searches in that country.176 Other
general search engines include Exalead, Gigablast, Munax,
Qwant, Sogou, and Youdao.177 
Not only are the number and popularity of alternative 
search engines growing, so is their diversity. Generalized
web search engines like Google now compete with selection-
based search engines, metasearch engines, web portals,
apps, and vertical market websites that embed search
functions within them.178 Others are customized to trades,
like IFACnet (accountancy); Fashion Net (fashion); and 
GlobalSpec (business).179 Importantly, some search engines
self-restrict by geography, including Accoona (China and
United States); Ansearch (Australia, United States, United
Kingdom, and New Zealand); Biglobe (Japan); Maktoob
173. See Amy Gesenhues, Study: Top 5 Search Engines See Search Traffic Drop 
by as Much as 31% Since December 2013, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (June 24, 2014,
11:00 AM), http://searchengineland.com/study-google-bing-yahoo-ask-aol-see-17-
32-decline-search-traffic-last-6-months-194634.
174. See Julie Marie Bedas, Search Engines Across the Globe, FOUNDER’S GUIDE
(July 10, 2015), http://foundersguide.com/search-engines-across-the-globe/.
175. Id. Baidu is the second largest search enginge in the world. Konrad
Krawczyk, Google Is Easily the Most Popular Search Engine, but Have You Heard 
Who’s in Second?, DIGITAL TRENDS (July 3, 2014, 11:34 AM),
http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/google-baidu-are-the-worlds-most-popular-
search-engines/.
176. Bedas, supra note 174.
177. See If You Search Only with Google then you Miss A LOT!!!! About 95%, 
SEARCH (Aug. 19, 2015), http://srch.3dmovies.com/2015/08/19/hello-world/
[hereinafter If You Search Only with Google].
178. See Sullivan, supra note 39.
179. A list of search engines delineated by trade, geographic scope, specific type
of information sought and more can be found at Search Engines, FASHION, 
http://efemale.blogspot.com/2015/01/search-engines.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2017).
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(Arab world); Rediff (India); Seznam (Czech Republic); and 
many more.180 Customized search engines exist for food
recipes, job searches, legal and medical information, news,
real estate, and more.181 
This proliferation reflects the decline in traditional and
generalized desktop searching.182 One study shows that the 
total number of people using traditional search engines
decreased from fifty-five percent in the first quarter of 2014
to forty-nine percent in the first quarter of 2015.183 More and
more searches occur on mobile devices, through apps, and
through social media.184 According to Abid Chaudhry, a
senior director at BIA/Kelsey, local searches on mobile apps
are increasingly taking share, given that eighty-six percent
of users’ time on a mobile device is spent on an app.185 
“Mobile behavior, marketplaces like Amazon, social sites
such as Facebook, and shrinking screen sizes continue to 
introduce quicker, smarter and more vocal ways of finding
information, services and products. In fact[,] the number of 
people using search engines continues to decline.”186 
These developments exacerbate enforcement of the right
to be forgotten. An Australian-based search platform, for
example, that specializes in legal information might link
Costeja to his 1998 debt, even if that 1998 debt does not
appear through a similar search on Google. If websites
containing European information can be accessed through a
litany of evolving search capabilities operated by various and
multiplying entities around the world—many without assets
in Europe—the right to be forgotten offers little anonymity.
One commentator identified this easy “workaround” by 
180. If You Search Only with Google, supra note 177.
181. Search Engines, supra note 179.
182. See Sullivan, supra note 39.
183. See id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
       
      
        
    
      
        
       
        
      
  
      
      
      
    
      
      
        
       
       
       
   
        
       
       
       
 
         
    
 
           
          
  
           
         
    
    
5272017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
simply switching search engines to “DuckDuckGo, which has 
no EU footprint and also doesn’t track cookies—and for now,
you’ll see the full unfiltered results.”187 
B. Web Wardens 
In conjunction with diversifying search platforms, more 
and more entities track and re-publish information that was
“erased” under the right to be forgotten. Afaq Tariq’s website,
“Hidden from Google,” was among the first,188 but larger
players followed, including the BBC, Reddit, and the 
Wikimedia Foundation.189 
Wikipedia’s page entitled, “Notices received from search
engines,” catalogues erasure requests by country of origin,
website, and file.190 Screen shots of the erasure requests are 
also included.191 While these sites do not pinpoint the 
identity of the person who requested data erasure, they do 
highlight the webpages targeted for anonymity. Webpages
involving criminal activity in Italy, murderers in Germany,
and a “porn star” in France vanish from Google searches in
Europe, but re-emerge on an increasing number of websites
in the digital commons that are accessible through a growing
number of alternative search capabilities.192 
News media also report on websites and stories that
were de-linked under European law. The Daily Mail, for
instance, reported on deleted links about Josef Fritzl who 
criminally held his family in captivity, and “Ronald Castree,
187. James Ball, EU’s Right to Be Forgotten: Guardian Articles Have Been
Hidden by Google, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/jul/02/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-guardian-google.
188. Hidden from Google, supra note 32; see Charlie Osborne, “Hidden from
Google” Tracks Sites Removed from Internet Searches, CNET NEWS (July 16,
2014), http://www.cnet.com/news/hidden-from-google-tracks-sites-removed-
from-internet-searches (describing Tariq’s efforts).
189. See McIntosh, supra note 34; sources cited supra note 35.
190. Notices Received from Search Engines, supra note 35.
191. Id.
192. See e.g., id.
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61, a pedophile who abducted an 11-year old girl with
learning difficulties before abusing and murdering her.”193 
News media reported on vanishing data about Scottish
football referee Dougie McDonald, who admitted to lying
about reversing a penalty, Paul Baxendale-Walker being
accused of fraud, and about Stan O’Neal, the former chair of 
Merrill Lynch.194 
Europeans sought suppression of all these stories, which
ironically boosted them further into the spotlight, creating a
“Streisand effect,” an attempt to hide information that spurs
the unintended consequence of publicizing it more widely.195 
The Guardian, The New York Times, The Wall Street
Journal, The Daily Mail, and scores of others publish stories
about the right to be forgotten generally and often cite to 
particular stories targeted for erasure.196 
C. Deep Web 
The futility of implementing the right to be forgotten
extends beyond diversifying search platforms and re-
publication of content from deleted links. Wikipedia, BBC,
193. Katherine Rushton, More than 280,000 People Ask Google for the Right to
Be Forgotten and Request more than a MILLION Pages Are Wiped from the 
Search Engine’s Results, DAILY MAIL (July 10, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
news/article-3156779/More-280-000-people-ask-Google-right-forgotten-request-
MILLION-pages-wiped-search-engine-s-results.html.
194. Ball, supra note 187; Danny Sullivan, Thanks To “Right To Be Forgotten,”
Google Now Censors The Press In The EU, MARKETING LAND (July 2, 2014),
http://marketingland.com/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-censorship-89783.
195. T.C., What Is the Streisand Effect?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 16, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-
explains-what-streisand-effect (noting the term was coined after American
entertainer Barbara Streisand’s attempt to suppress photographs of her Malibu
Home resulted in extensive publicity, videos, spoof songs, and more).
196. See generally Greg Sterling, Media Companies Republishing Google
Right-To-Be-Forgotten Links, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://searchengineland.com/media-companies-republishing-google-right-
forgotten-removals-206101. Of course, the right to be forgotten is not the only 
avenue for attempting to scrub Internet data. Copyright law, defamation law,
and non-legal strategies, have been employed to bar or limit access to personal 
data.
       
       
     
         
     
        
      
       
         
    
         
      
     
     
       
       
       
        
 
             
            
      
 
            
    
         
     
 
           
     
 
      
           
    
      
          
           
        
      
       
5292017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
Reddit, and others republish de-listed content, but these 
efforts take place on the surface web.197 The surface web is
the entire Internet for most users, but it represents a fraction
of available content. The surface web is that part of the 
Internet that is accessible by standard search engines, either
by indexing, or through use of the site’s IP address.198 
By contrast, the deep web is unfamiliar to most of the 
public and is larger by orders of magnitude. Characterized as
the submerged part of the iceberg,199 researchers describe 
the deep web’s size in various and conflicting ways: over 96
percent of content on the world wide web,200 unguessable,201 
7500 terabytes,202 infinite,203 and 500x the size of the surface 
web.204 Although imprecise, these estimates indicate that the 
deep web contains much more content than the surface web.
Generally speaking, the deep web is the content not
indexed by standard search engines, like Google.205 The only
U.S. court that has attempted to define the deep web,
197. See McIntosh, supra note 34; sources cited supra note 35.
198. Michael K. Bergman, White Paper: The Deep Web: Surfacing Hidden
Value, J. Elec. Publ’g (Aug. 2001), http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jep/
3336451.0007.104?view=text;rgn=main.
199. Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Ashley Madison and the Deep (and
Sometimes Dark) Web, MONT. LAW., Nov. 2015, at 18.
200. Id.; see Joseph Hirschhorn Howard, Searching the Deep Web and the
Unmapped Internet, WEEKLY PIQUE (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.weeklypique.com/ 
2015/10/16/searching-the-deep-web/.
201. See Jose Pagliery, The Deep Web You Don’t Know About, CNN MONEY 
(Mar. 10, 2014, 9:18 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/10/technology/deep-
web/.
202. Bergman, supra note 198.
203. Common Deep Web and Big Data Questions Answered—Part 1,
BRIGHTPLANET (Nov. 25, 2014), https://brightplanet.com/2014/11/common-deep-
web-big-data-questions-answered-part-1/ (“The Internet has grown so vast and 
so large that we now classify the Deep Web as infinite.”).
204. SCH. INFO. MGMT. & SYS., HOW MUCH INFORMATION? at 4 (2003),
http://groups.ischool.berkeley.edu/archive/how-much-info-
2003/printable_report.pdf (“[T]he ‘deep web’ is perhaps 400 to 550 times larger
than the information on the ‘surface.’”).
205. See Bergman, supra note 198.
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described it as follows:
The portion of the Web that is not theoretically indexable through
the use of “spidering” technology, because other Web pages do not 
link to it, is called the “Deep Web.” Such sites or pages can still be
made publically accessible without being publically indexable by,
for example, using individual or mass emailings (also known as
“spam”) to distribute the URL to potential readers or customers, or
by using types of Web links that cannot be found by spiders but can
be seen and used by readers.206 
The deep web contains all manner of content including
text, photographs, videos, and music.207 Large academic,
library, and proprietary databases are stored on the deep
web,208 including core content from the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, Thomson Reuters Westlaw, and NASA.209 
The distinctions between the deep web and the surface web
are sometimes imprecise because content on the deep web
can be “surfaced” in several ways.210 Similarly, the deep web
can be searched even though it is not indexed like the surface 
web.211 While research in the deep web requires considerable 
technical facility, specialized deep web browsers, like Tor,
allow visitors to browse the deep web without having to rely
entirely on pre-identified URLs.212 
The dark web has been characterized as a subset of the 
deep web.213 Controversial and illicit transactions reputedly
206. Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 418–19 (E.D. Pa.
2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
207. See Pagliery, supra note 201.
208. See Bergman, supra note 198 (listing sixty of the largest deep web 
databases, including NASA, National Climatic Data Center, U.S. Trademarks
and Patents, U.S. Census, SEC EDGAR, and more).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Tor: Overview, TORPROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/about/
overview.html.en (last visited Apr. 14, 2017).
212. See Stephanie Minnock, Should Copyright Laws Be Able to Keep Up with
Online Piracy?, 12 J. ON TELECOMM & HIGH TECH. L. 523, 539–40 (2014).
213. See Stuart Andrews, The Dark Side of the Web, ALPHR (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://www.alphr.com/features/356254/the-dark-side-of-the-web.
       
      
        
        
       
       
       
          
      
      
       
        
   
       
        
        
   
       
        
      
     
     
  
 
           
      
     
    
              
           
            
        
             
           
      
      
        
      
      
5312017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
transpire on the dark web, including human trafficking,
narcotic sales, and contracts for killings.214 The dark web
relies on anonymity tools to conceal both the seeker and the 
provider of such services.215 It is not accessible through
surface web browsers like Internet Explorer or Firefox, but
is accessible via specialized and anonymized browsers such
as Tor or I2P.216 Tor facilitates browsing of dark web services
without disclosing the user’s IP address, which would
otherwise reveal the user’s network identity and location.217 
The Tor protocol leverages pseudomains like .onion as well
as anonymous introduction points and relays between users,
making de-anonymization difficult.218 
While the dark web and deep web contain criminal
elements, both are routinely used for less nefarious purposes
by those seeking anonymity. The U.S. Navy uses Tor for
intelligence gathering.219 Journalists pursue controversial
leads in the deep web to avoid government monitoring.220 An 
array of law enforcement agencies search for illicit conduct
using Tor because Tor hides government IP addresses,
ensuring covert surveillance.221 Whistleblowers reveal
corporate and governmental malfeasance on the deep web to 
avoid retribution.222 
214. See Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, Going Dark: Scratching the Surface of
Government Surveillance, 23 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 469, 482 (2015).
215. Id. at 482–83.
216. See id.
217. Keith D. Watson, Note, The Tor Network: A Global Inquiry Into the Legal
Status of Anonymity Networks, 11 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 715, 721 (2012).
218. See Stephanie K. Pell, Jonesing for a Privacy Mandate, Getting a
Technology Fix—Doctrine to Follow, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 489, 525–26 (2013)
(“Tor is an ‘onion routing’ technology which hides a user’s IP address, making it
appear to originate from a Tor server rather than the actual address from which 
the user is connecting to the Internet.”).
219. TORPROJECT, supra note 211.
220. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 199, at 18. 
221. Pell, supra note 218, at 528.
222. Watson, supra note 217, at 723.
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But increasingly, normal Internet users opt for deep web
browsing simply for additional privacy.223 Tor’s website 
states that Tor “prevents somebody watching your Internet
connection from learning what sites you visit, and it prevents
the sites you visit from learning your physical location.”224 
Invasive commercial browsers and search engines cannot
monitor, collect, aggregate, and sell user information, like 
browsing history, if the user is effectively hidden while 
searching the web. Similarly, governmental surveillance is
rendered substantially more difficult.
In such a landscape, it is difficult to imagine how EU
authorities could enforce the right to be forgotten. Both
content providers and users are effectively anonymous.225 
Regulating browsers like Tor would be highly difficult and
ultimately futile, as browsers differ materially from search
engines and regulation of one international browser would
only spawn regional browsers outside European reach. It is
somewhat ironic that the deep web, used increasingly by
those seeking privacy, undermines the privacy objective at
the heart of the right to be forgotten.
D. Internet of Things 
The right to be forgotten must also confront the Internet
of Things, a context in which everyday objects communicate 
autonomously online.226 Technology infused objects gather,
analyze, and send data through the Internet automatically,
without an individual’s prompting, and often without that
individual’s awareness.227 Some libraries, for example,
223. See TORPROJECT, supra note 211. 
224. TOR, https://www.torproject.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2017).
225. See id.
226. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 98– 
117 (2014) (explaining the functioning of the Internet of Things).
227. See id.
       
       
      
      
       
      
       
          
          
     
      
   
     
      
       
      
        
 
             
   
        
    
 
          
            
         
     
  
          
         
   
        
       
 
           
     
    
            
    
       
          
5332017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
electronically tag every book in the collection,228 while tech
savvy dentists prescribe toothbrushes engrafted with tiny
sensors to determine hygiene behavior.229 A pint of beer with
tilt sensors records, analyzes, and transmits consumption
rates.230 Of course, smart watches, smart phones, and 
computer tablets absorb gigabytes of data exhaust. From
steps taken in a day, to hours clocked in sleep, the technology
in our pockets and on our wrists absorb everything we allow,
and even more of which we are unaware.231 Precise locational
data is captured by license plate readers, automobile GPS,
and smart phones.232 
“Smart meters,” another interesting example, produce 
meaningful efficiencies in utility consumption.233 Replacing
monthly inspections by utility employees, smart meters
capture and transmit precise utility usage in real time.234 
While still in the nascent stages in the United States,235 over
228. See Kendra Mayfield, Tagging Books to Prevent Theft, WIRED (May 20,
2002, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2002/05/tagging-books-to-prevent-theft/.
229. See Marcia Simon, How the Kolibree ‘Smart Toothbrush’ Improves Dental
Hygiene, DENTISTRY IQ, (May 19, 2016), http://www.dentistryiq.com/articles/
2016/05/how-the-kolibree-smart-toothbrush-improves-dental-hygiene.html.
230. See Kelsey Campbell-Dollaghan, Vessyl: A Cup That Uses Molecular
Sensors To Track Everything You Drink, GIZMODO (June 12, 2014, 1:27 PM),
http://gizmodo.com/vessyl-a-cup-that-uses-molecular-analysis-to-track-eve-
1589975359 (“[A] cup that can calculate detailed information about what your
[sic] drinking—and sync that information with your fitness tracker and 
peripheral apps.”).
231. See Jeremy Andrew Ciarabellini, Trading Privacy for Angry Birds: A Call
for Courts to Reevaluate Privacy Expectations in Modern Smartphones, 38 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1491, 1491–92 (2015).
232. VICTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 88–89 
(2013).
233. See Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161, 161 (2011).
234. Id. at 165.
235. See Smart Meter Deployments Continue to Rise, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=8590
(identifying approximately thirty-six million smart meters recording and
transmitting energy use in the United States as of 2012).
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200 million smart meters are expected in the EU by 2020.236 
One commentator noted that such metering can “distinguish
the microwave from the refrigerator, or even the light bulb
in the bathroom from the light bulb in the dining room.”237 
Rather than simply transmitting a resident’s electricity
usage for billing, smart meters now unveil when the resident
showers, leaves for work, cooks, and vacations.238 That data
presents the groundwork for a multitude of observations
about the resident’s behaviors, attitudes, and proclivities.239 
One study claimed that the electrical signal coming from a
resident’s home revealed with ninety-six percent accuracy
the specific television show viewed by the resident.240 
Data collection from smart meters is augmented by
smart homes, which festoon the home with sensors to track
and calibrate everything from garage door usage, to the 
patterns and frequency with which the oven is used, or the 
236. PIKE RESEARCH, SMART METERS IN EUROPE: ADVANCED METERING 
INFORMATION FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN EUROPE: BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY 
ISSUES, COUNTRY PROFILES, KEY INDUSTRY PLAYERS, AND MARKET FORECASTS
passim (2012), http://www.navigantresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/
AMIEU-12-Executive-Summary.pdf
237. Patrick Thibodeau, The Internet of Things Could Encroach on Personal
Privacy, COMPUTERWORLD (May 3, 2014, 7:45 AM),
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2488949/emerging-technology/the-
internet-of-things-could-encroach-on-personal-privacy.html (quoting Stephen 
Wicker).
238. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID 
CYBERSECURITY 231 (2014), http:// nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2014/NIST.IR.
7628r1.pdf (stating that smart meter data can reveal information about people’s 
lifestyles and appliance use); Stephen Wicker & R.J. Thomas, A Privacy-Aware
Architecture for Demand Response Systems, CORNELL U., 
http://wisl.ece.cornell.edu/wicker/publications.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
239. See Wicker & Thomas, supra note 238.
240. MIRO ENEV ET. AL., INFERRING TV CONTENT FROM ELECTRICAL NOISE 1
(2010), http://miro.enev.us/papers/EMI_CCS_2011.pdf; see also Chester
Wisniewski, Smart Meter Hacking Can Disclose Which TV Shows and Movies You
Watch, NAKED SEC. (Jan. 8, 2012), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/01/
08/28c3-smart-meter-hacking-can-disclose-which-tv-shows-and-movies-you-
watch/.
       
       
     
 
      
        
        
       
         
           
      
        
      
   
     
       
     
         
        
           
     
        
       
       
       
   
         
        
       
 
         
      
       
             
     
      
            
    
5352017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
refrigerator is open.241 Software integrates this data with
data from other smart home users to create predictive 
schematics.242 
Even if the homeowner knowingly consents to such data
collection through smart meters and smart homes, what
about guests? It is tempting to think that a guest’s 
entertainment preferences ascertained when visiting in a
smart home could not be linked to that guest. It is tempting
to think that data exhaust from a passenger in a smart car
could not be linked to that particular passenger. While 
probably true today, such bromides will soon dissolve. “They
fundamentally rely on the fallacious distinction between
‘identifying’ and ‘non-identifying’ attributes.”243 
Something as anonymous as location points—with 
nothing more—can be used to pinpoint an individual. Cesar
A. Hidalgo and Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, researchers at
MIT, correctly identified individuals using as few as four
locational data points.244 Indeed, a handful of past location
points in conjunction with a few other data points reveals a
person’s “future” location.245 There are oceans of data already
available, already recorded and archived. Given that a
handful of locational points reveals identity, privacy regimes
must abandon the futile focus on outlawing data collection,
and instead prescribe data uses that are associated with
discrete privacy harms.
Smart offices and smart cars are not far behind, with
monitoring devices embedded in car engines, work badges,
and water coolers.246 Toll tags, license plate readers, and the 
241. See Balough, supra note 233, at 165–66.
242. See id. at 162.
243. Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 110, at 25. 
244. Yves-Alexande de Montejoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy
Bounds of Human Mobility, SCI. REP., Mar. 25, 2013, at 1. 
245. Tucker, supra note 113.
246. See Ben Waber, Augmenting Social Reality in the Workplace, MIT TECH.
REV. (May 15, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/514371/augmenting-
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wealth of information captured by event data recorders
(black boxes), transform car travel into discrete chambers for
passive data collection, particularly in light of newer
automobiles that increasingly trumpet Internet
connectivity.247 At the office, work badges loaded with
sensors monitor employees’ rapidity of speech, tone of voice,
and workplace social interactions.248 One organization seeks
increased productivity by integrating software into the office 
infrastructure so that select employees are prompted to 
interact when economically expedient.249 The software’s 
algorithm spurs robotic movement of workplace walls, water
coolers, and coffee machines to ensure that specific
employees interact at discrete times.250 While most offices
have not integrated the passive data collected from
employees this dramatically, the trend toward collection and
use of passive data in workplaces continues.251 
The Internet of Things is emerging. Over 220 billion
connected devices worldwide are expected by 2020,252 
prompting Cisco to prognosticate that “pretty much
social-reality-in-the-workplace/; H. James Wilson, Wearable Gadgets Transform 
How Companies Do Business, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 20, 2013, 7:52 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/wearable-gadgets-transform-how-companies-do-
business-1382128410?tesla=y.
247. CHING-YAO CHAN, CONNECTED VEHICLES IN A CONNECTED WORLD, 1–2 
(2011), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=5783569;
Francesca Svarcas, Turning a New LEAF: A Privacy Analysis of CARWINGS 
Electric Vehicle Data Collection and Transmission, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 165, 167–74 (2012).
248. Waber, supra note 246; Wilson, supra note 246. 
249. See Waber, supra note 246. 
250. Id.
251. See Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague, Intrusive Monitoring: Employee 
Privacy Expectations Are Reasonable in Europe, Destroyed in the United States, 
26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 1001–18 (2011).
252. Tim Bajarin, The Next Big Thing for Tech: The Internet of Everything, 
TIME (Jan. 13, 2014), http://time.com/539/the-next-big-thing-for-tech-the-
internet-of-everything/.
       
       
       
      
      
       
       
         
       
      
  
      
      
       
      
      
        
      
     
       
        
     
      
       
 
      
 
       
       
       
      
        
              
        
    
 
5372017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
everything you can imagine will wake up.”253 Combined with
a world of other and easily accessible data points, the 
identity and entertainment preferences of the guest in the 
smart home and the identity of the passenger in the smart
car are readily uncovered.254 Just because a particular data
point is anonymous or non-identifying at the point of 
collection does not mean it will remain so.255 Non-identifying
information quickly loses anonymity when combined with
the vast and diverse data already available, suggesting
inevitability of “re-identification.”256 
Capacious privacy laws overlook the Internet of Things,
passive data collection, and automated gathering of data
exhaust. The EU Directive turns on data collection, requiring
notice and consent before personal data can be lawfully
collected.257 As a result, the Directive ignores the growing
reality that individuals rarely know when their personal
information is collected, rendering notice and consent
requirements irrelevant. This digital landscape portends the 
futility of omnibus privacy laws, a notion tacitly
acknowledged in a report from the 2014 World Economic
Forum: “The growth of data, the sophistication of ubiquitous
computing and the borderless flow of data are all
outstripping the ability to effectively govern on a global
basis.”258 
V. REGULATING FOR PRIVACY, RISK OF HARM 
Responding to loss of privacy in the Internet age with
253. What Is the Internet of Everything?, CISCO SYSTEMS, http://www.cisco.com/ 
c/m/en_in/tomorrow-starts-here/ioe.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
254. See Ohm, supra note 109, at 1716–25
255. See id. at 1703–04.
256. See Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 110, at 26. 
257. Data Directive, supra note 50, art. 7, 10; Data Regulation, supra note 61.
258. A.T. KEARNEY, WORLD ECON. FORUM, RETHINKING PERSONAL DATA: A NEW
LENS FOR STRENGTHENING TRUST 3 (2014), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_RethinkingPersonalData_ANewLens_Report_2014.pdf.
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unilateral, extra-jurisdictional laws that mandate deletion of 
personal information if that information is deemed
irrelevant fails to meaningfully advance the original goal of 
increased privacy. To a large degree, the personal data
individuals seek to protect has already been published.
Recapturing and quarantining or erasing that data is
implausible for the reasons detailed above. Further, the 
means available for gathering more such information are 
increasingly automated and integrated into daily life.259 As a 
result, new privacy regulation cannot simply supplement old
privacy regulation, especially when the analogue predated
the Internet. Rather, effective privacy regulation must adapt
to the current landscape by tailoring the law to risk of harm.
Surreptitious monitoring of others’ browser history that is
then shared with marketers or aggregated for profiling
purposes, for example, constitutes a discrete use of personal
information that policymakers could choose to regulate.
“Regulating the use of sensitive data as it relates to 
particular risks or harms better comports with consumer law
generally and permits the needed adaptability to reflect
context and changing technology.”260 
Data generated by online transactions, as well as data
generated passively, simply by living within the Internet of 
Things, cannot be outfitted with innumerable notice and
consent forms. Technology has nullified those legal tools.
Data collection, both active and passive, increases by orders
of magnitude in conjunction with integrated systems capable 
of transferring and analyzing that data.261 Rather than an
over-broad EU law that captures oceans of harmless data
processing and that incentivizes uneven enforcement at the 
expense of international comity,262 privacy law should
259. See supra Section III.D.
260. McKay Cunningham, Next Generation Privacy: The Internet of Things,
Data Exhaust, and Reforming Regulation by Risk of Harm, 2 GRONINGEN J. INT’L 
LAW 115, 142 (2014).
261. See Bajarin, supra note 252. 
262. See supra Part III.
       
        
 
      
       
       
       
      
        
      
     
         
    
      
      
     
     
       
      
   
    
      
      
     
      
      
        
        
 
             
          
        
    
               
          
  
        
       
          
5392017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
directly address harm to the user in conjunction with user
expectation.
Users expect online purchases, geolocation logs, health,
and activity data from wearable devices, Internet banking
transactions, and email addresses required for specific
business deals to remain with the relevant parties for the 
original and intended uses.263 Regulatory schemes, like the 
Directive, that hinge on the “processing” of this data, or even
the collection of it, dilute the privacy goal by capturing the 
deluge of data that falls within the regulation’s ambit.264 It 
is not the fact of this data’s processing that merits legal
protection, but its inappropriate use.265 Secretive 
monitoring, undisclosed transfer to unidentified parties, and
monetization of personal data through marketing and
profiling more readily approximate privacy harms and
justify regulatory safeguards.266 Determining the risk of 
harm based on discrete and unwarranted uses of personal
data narrows the legislative scope, allowing incremental and
targeted reform.
Effective privacy regulation must reject the EU’s 
capacious definitions of personal information and processing,
in favor of a taxonomy that better approximates the 
Internet’s architecture and the malleable manner in which
digital data originates, transforms, and eventually
recedes.267 Privacy regulations more closely parallel this
reality by distinguishing passively created data from actively
created data, by delineating “external” data from “internal”
263. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 529 
(2006); see Joshua J. McIntyre, Balancing Expectations of Online Privacy: Why
Internet Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected as Personally Identifiable
Information, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 895–96 (2011).
264. See Ambrose, supra note 9, at 18; Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy
Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1972– 
79 (2013).
265. See generally DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 188–89 (2008).
266. See id. at 131–32.
267. See Solove, supra note 263 at 481–82, 485.
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data, and by identifying original data from downstream
transformation or modification of that data.268 Passive data,
like records of where a user’s mouse hovers when visiting a 
website or data exhaust captured by the Internet of Things,
merits a different legal paradigm than “active” data that was 
deliberately and originally created, like a photograph of the 
user taken by the user and posted by the user.269 Privacy
protections differ depending on such distinctions.270 A person
seeking to take down a picture of herself that she posted on
a social networking site deserves separate legal treatment
from a politician seeking to take down text from an
unflattering blog posted by a third party.271 
Indeed, the legal infrastructure for many of these 
permutations is already in place. In the United States and 
the EU, defamation law protects against untrue harmful
publications, reflecting the ethos behind the right to be 
forgotten.272 Copyright law also advances objectives that are 
similar to the right to be forgotten.273 When hackers illegally
obtained and published revealing photographs of U.S.
celebrities, lawyers for the celebrities leveraged copyright
law to force websites and search engines to erase the pilfered
images.274 
“[T]he Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act provides
for a right to delete personal data. The Fair Credit Reporting
Act restricts the ability of consumer reporting agencies to 
268. Ambrose, supra note 9, at 11.
269. See id.
270. See generally Solove, supra note 263. 
271. See Ambrose, supra note 9, at 11, 18.
272. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–43 (1974); New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
273. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458–60 (2d Cir. 2001).
274. See, e.g., Eriq Gardner, Google Responds to Jennifer Lawrence Attorney’s 
$100 Million Lawsuit Threat, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:23 PM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/google-responds-jennifer-lawrence-
attorneys-737656.
       
       
       
      
      
  
     
     
        
        
        
     
    
       
       
          
      
  
 
               
      
  
      
  
          
  
          
           
            
        
          
          
         
    
       
         
    
            
  
     
5412017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
report on bankruptcies and criminal proceedings that are 
beyond a certain number of years old.”275 These legal
doctrines carry the added benefit of refinement through
decades of case law, legislation, and other democratic
processes.
Bankruptcy protections,276 privacy controls integrated
into criminal law,277 like grand jury proceedings,278 and laws 
allowing sealed and expunged court records for juveniles279
all protect privacy rights in distinct contexts more closely
associated with the potential harm that would result absent
such protections.280 One commentator suggests that
specifically tailored privacy laws like these illustrate 
continuity with EU privacy objectives rather than
disharmony: “developments in American law signal a
receptivity to EU privacy norms that is not well reflected in
media and free speech advocates’ desire to cast the Atlantic
divide as irreconcilable divergence.”281 
275. Daniel Solove, What Google Must Forget: The EU Ruling on the Right to
Be Forgotten, LINKEDIN: TECH (May 13, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ 
20140513230300-2259773-what-google-must-forget-the-eu-ruling-on-the-right-
to-be-forgotten [perma.cc/9XGZ-9YK3].
276. See Process—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS. http://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/process-bankruptcy-basics (last
visited Apr. 3, 2017) (discussing United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§
101–1532 (2012)).
277. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(3) (2014). Upon conviction, the Federal
Code and most state criminal procedure codes provide for a pre-sentence
investigation and report, usually researched and written by a probation officer to
guide the judge’s sentencing ruling. The pre-sentencing reports often contain
hearsay, opinion, and speculation. As a result, most criminal procedure codes call
for confidentiality of pre-sentence reports. See Peter A. Winn, Online Court
Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age of Electronic 
Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 309 (2004).
278. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d).
279. See Anna Kessler, Excavating Expungement Law: A Comprehensive
Approach, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 403, 417–18 (2015).
280. See generally Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The New American Privacy, 44 GEO.
J. INT’L L. 365 (2013).
281. Id. at 410.
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In contrast to these specific measures, the right to be 
forgotten requires that data controllers delete links to 
“irrelevant” content.282 Data controllers, like Google, decide 
whether the requested content is irrelevant or inadequate,
not a court, agency, or other public body.283 “[I]t is for the 
company—and not the individual—to prove that the data
cannot be deleted because it is still needed or is still
relevant.”284 Paralyzing fines for refusing valid erasure 
requests285 incentivize Google to err on the side of deleting
content, which perhaps explains why Google has so far
approved forty-three percent of those requests, de-listing
approximately 830,180 URLs as of the date of this
publication.286 Privacy is poorly served through a rubric of 
economic intimidation and the catch-all standard of 
irrelevance.287 Negative secondary effects swallow what
little, if any, privacy objectives the law seeks to effectuate.
Moreover, data’s shelf life on the web is far shorter than
conventionally believed. “Like other resources, information
is perishable, depreciating in value over time. Depreciation
will occur at different rates for different pieces of 
information, which correlates to the content’s relevance and
accuracy.”288 Claims that digital data are impossible to forget
or that once posted, data forever remain readily accessible,
282. EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 1.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. The current Data Directive allows fines up to two percent worldwide
turnover, which will increase to the greater of €10 million or two percent of
annual worldwide turnover or the greater of €20 million or four percent
worldwide turnover under the new Regulation. See Data Regulation, supra note
61; Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 128; see also Emily Adams Shoor, Note,
Narrowing the Right to Be Forgotten: Why the European Union Needs to Amend
the Proposed Data Protection Regulation, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 487, 488, 508 
(2014).
286. Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, 
supra note 17.
287. See Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 23, at 370, 373. 
288. Ambrose, supra note 9, at 13.
       
    
      
      
       
       
      
      
     
      
       
        
      
        
    
     
      
      
    
     
   
      
       
 
       
    
   
    
   
    
             
        
      
      
          
       
 
5432017] THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
are wrong.289 An entire subculture of archivists strain to 
offset the Internet’s digital decay and educate the public to 
the fact that the Internet continuously sheds tremendous
amounts of information.290 Using URLs as a metric, one 
study tracked tweets about significant events including the 
H1N1 virus and the Syrian revolution.291 Approximately
eleven percent of the content associated with those tweets
disappeared within one year, increasing to twenty-seven
percent after two years.292 A litany of diverse causes
contributes to digital decay.293 Importantly, personal bias is
not among them.294 If digital information must disappear, it
should be culled through objective, automated processes,
rather than by those with the most bias toward it.295 
CONCLUSION 
Near-universal access to information through the 
Internet arrived without lead-time to develop policy to guide 
its use. Within two decades, the Internet connected people 
across the globe to great oceans of data on an infrastructure 
itself unbounded by national borders. The Internet’s 
international and fluid architecture increased its resilience 
to discrete regulation of the information accessible thereon,
creating a built-in barrier to state sponsored censorship. This
advantage was largely unhindered by search engines and
289. Id. at 1, 9, 12.
290. See id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See id.
295. The Stanford research paper written by Google founders Sergey Brin and
Larry Page describes the web as “a vast collection of completely uncontrolled 
heterogeneous documents,” and suggest that search engines provide
decontextualized content through black box algorithms. See Sergey Brin &
Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine, 
STAND. U., http://infolab.stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html (last visited Apr. 3,
2017).
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algorithms biased, if at all, by their primary objective— 
usefulness.
But the inability to censor information on the Internet
carries a high price in privacy. Personal data, vital to social
interaction, are readily extracted, monitored, copied,
transferred, and leveraged without the individual’s 
concomitant control. Identity theft, cyber stereotyping,
public embarrassment, and degraded confidentiality are 
among the many harms incident to the erosion of privacy
through digital connectivity. The question arises, how to 
maintain the benefit of uncensored data while 
simultaneously reducing privacy harms?
The EU, through legal recognition of the right to be 
forgotten, attempted to address that question. The EU law
facilitates individualized control over personal information
on the Internet by requiring that data controllers, like 
Google, delist links to irrelevant personal information. The 
lawyer with an extinguished twenty-year-old debt
successfully demanded that Google delist a newspaper
article that connected him to the debt. Others followed. More 
than 800,000 URLs have been delisted as individuals seek to 
erase access to their personal information, often
indiscretions, from public view.
While laudable in the abstract, in its application, the 
new law not only generates negative secondary effects, it
largely fails to achieve meaningful privacy for those who 
exercise the right to be forgotten. The law emerged by
accretion. It was built on the scaffolding of previous privacy
laws—laws that long predated the Internet. If we are, in fact,
“still in the first minutes of the first day of the Internet
revolution,”296 lawmakers seeking to regulate Internet use 
must consider its architecture. Instead, European
296. See Stephen Levingston & International Herald Tribune, Internet
Entrepreneurs Are Upbeat Despite Market’s Rough Ride, N.Y. TIMES (May 24,
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/24/business/worldbusiness/24iht-
hype.2.t.html (quoting Scott Cook, then chairman of Intuit, Inc.) (internal
quotations omitted).
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lawmakers mostly ignored the ephemeral and borderless
nature of data creation, modification, transmission, and 
storage on the Internet. The only provisions acknowledging
the transnational nature of Internet data flow are catchall
extra-jurisdictional provisions that purport to govern any
entity anywhere that processes or controls personal
information.
Application of EU law to anyone who processes personal
information theoretically addresses the problem of 
transnational data flow, but it also creates a raft of negative 
secondary effects. Instead of targeting the harms that result
from loss of privacy, the law captures almost every entity
doing business on the Internet, most of which are innocuous.
Because of its near-universal application, the law invites
arbitrary enforcement. European officials can target
disfavored organizations for investigation and prosecution.
The law also disregards the sovereignty and democratic
principles of other nations, whose citizens must comply with
European law without having a participatory voice in the 
creation of the law.
Even individuals who successfully petition for deletion of 
their personal information achieve little under the right to 
be forgotten. Many experience a Streisand effect; their
attempt to conceal information only amplifies it. The 
resilience of the Internet also undermines the right to be 
forgotten. Dedicated websites monitor each delisted URL.
News agencies repost delisted links and the deep web
remains largely unreachable by the EU law. The Internet of 
Things continues to advance, exacerbating enforcement of 
the law, as more and more personal information is
unknowingly collected by ordinary objects and transmitted
over the Internet.
Several nations outside the EU have created similar
privacy laws, but the EU’s example in this regard should not
be emulated. Policing privacy on the Internet through
omnibus legislation that accounts for transnational data flow
by requiring everyone’s compliance, while simultaneously
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overlooking the resilience of the Internet, foments more 
harm than facilitates good. Protecting privacy in the 
information age requires policies tailored to privacy harms.
Until policymakers require a closer nexus between user
privacy and potential harm attending its violation, efforts to 
regulate the Internet generally will yield outsized and
unwanted secondary effects while only minimally achieving
meaningful privacy protections.
